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THE CO!\STITUTIO:\IAL RIGHTS OF 
TEACHERS AND.PROFESSORSt 
WILLIAM VAN ALSTYNE* 
In 1926, a young Tennessee biology teacher, John Thomas 
Scopes, was charged with "teach[ing] in the public schools ... a 
certain theory that denied the story of the divine creation of man, as 
taught in the Bible, and teach[ing] instead thereof that man had 
descended from a lower order of animals,"1 all in violation of a 
Tennessee criminal statute.2 Broadcast over radio and widely covered 
t This article does not attempt to review substantial sources of legal protection teachers and 
professors may hold under state statutes, administrative codes, collective bargaining 
agreements, or the common law of contracts. Neither does it review the substantial influence of 
accrediting associations and professional associations in the development of standards, the 
effective use of their good offices to secure institutional compliance with those standards, and the 
use of their resources to secure redresS" in individual cases. These are, in fact, substantial sources 
of quasi-legal protection. In the past academic year alone, the American Association of 
University Professors acted on nearly 750 complaints. For a brief description of current case 
work by the AAUP, see Committee A on Aeademic Freedom and Tenure, Report 1969-1970,56 
A.A.U.P. BULL. 153 (1970); B. Davis, Principles and Cases: The Mediative Work of the 
AA UP, in id. at 169. Increasingly, the National Education Association has added to the 
professional services available to aggrieved teaehers. 
Confined to a discussion of constitutional norms, this article also makes no effort to review 
the complex tests distinguishing schools and colleges still regarded as sufficiently "private" that 
thej may not be uniformly bound by the Bill of Rights, the fourteenth amendment, or federal 
statutes based solely on the power of Congress to implement these provisions of the 
Constitution. For further consideration of this closely related subject, see O'Neil, Private 
Universities and Public Law, 19 BUFFALO L. REV. 155 (1970); Schubert, State Action and the 
Private University, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 323 (1970). For a bibliography of material in this area, 
see Project-Procedural Due Process and Campus Disorder: A Comparison of Law and 
Practice, 1970 DUKE L.J. 763,808. 
* Professor of Law, Duke University. 
An abridged version of this article will appear in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS: WHAT THEY 
ARE-WHAT THEY SHOULD BE (Dorsen ed. 1970). 
I. Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105,289 S.W. 363 (1927). 
2. Acts of 1925, ch. 27, § l, [1925) Tenn. Laws 50, as amended. TENN. CoDE ANN. § 49-
1922 (1966 Replacement) (repealed 1967). 
841 
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by national reporters including the redoubtable H.L. Mencken, the 
trial pitted William Jennings Bryan as special counsel for the state 
against the formidable skills of Clarence Darrow and Arthur Garfield 
Hays. While the courtroom drama of the Scopes Monkey Trial is 
familiar to many, hardly anyone remembers that Scopes was 
convicted and fined $100, that he immediately dropped out of 
teaching, and soon thereafter moved to another state. 
On appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court, counsel for Scopes 
raised two claims of constitutional significan~. Contending first that 
the underlying statute offended the religious establishment clause of 
the state constitution,3 they also argued that the anti-evolution statute, 
as applied, violated the fourteenth amendment to the United States 
Constitution by abridging Scopes' liberty to teach the subject of 
biology freely, according to his own best professional understanding. 
Again, however, the immediate outcome was a libertarian disaster. 
The Tennessee Supreme Court observed that the criminal statute 
did not forbid either Scopes or anyone else to express his personal or 
professional views about the Bible, evolution, or any other subject 
when he did so merely as a private citizen acting on his own time, 
outside the environment of a public school classroom. It pointed out, 
moreover, that the statute had no application to private schools and to 
private teachers who were wholly at liberty to utilize their freedom of 
contract, their property, and their professional skills to provide 
whatever latitude of teaching freedom they desired. Conceding that 
the state might be constitutionally restricted from unlimited control 
over such private arrangements,4 the court held that the fourteenth 
amendment had no similar relevance to statutes limited to on-the-job 
duties of public employees.5 Scopes had not been compelled to teach 
in the public schools; the conditions on which the opportunity was 
made available to him were freely disclosed in advance, and he need 
not have accepted the job if for any reason he found the terms 
distasteful. Moreover, the court reasoned, having subsequently 
resolved that he could no longer conscientiously perform his duties, he 
3. TENN. CoNST. art. I, § 3. 
4. The United States Supreme Court had recently taken a similar position in invalidating two 
state laws as applied to private school teachers and private schools. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 
268 U.S. 510 (1925) (law required parents to enroll children in a public school, forbidding 
enrollment in a private school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1922) (law forbade the 
teaching of german in any school to children below the eighth grade). 
5. 154 Tenn. at 109-10,289 S.W. at 365-66. 
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was free to give notice and to resign without recrimination by the state 
or inquiry into his reasons. So long as he worked for the state, 
however, he had no right to disregard the public will manifest in the 
criminal law applicable to his responsibilities within the public 
employment relationship. Indeed, in the view of the Tennessee 
Supreme Court, the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution did 
not apply at all: 
[Scopes] had no right or privilege to serve the state except upon such terms as 
the state prescribed. 
The statute before us . . . is an act of the state as a corporation, a proprietor, 
an employer. It is a declaration of a master as to the character of work the 
master's servant shall, or rather shall not, perform. In dealing with its own 
employees engaged upon its own work, the state is not hampered by the 
limitations of . .. the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States.' 
If the Tennessee court had noticed a paragraph in an opinion of 
the Supreme Court of t_he United States issued only six months 
earlier, it might not have treated teacher Scopes' claim so lightly. 
While the case before the Supreme Court in Frost Trucking Co. v. 
Railroad Commission7 had been wholly different and less dramatic on 
its facts, dealing merely with the regulation of trucks on state-owned 
public highways, the general character of the overall constitutional 
issue was very similar in both cases. In Frost the Supreme Court 
assumed that no one had a constitutional right to force a state to 
construct public roads and that the plaintiff trucking company would 
have had no recourse had it been unable to haul goods at all for lack 
of such state-provided roads. The Court then considered whether these 
facts necessarily implied that the state could arbitrarily attach 
whatever conditions it wished upon the use of its roads on the claim 
that any permitted use would be a mere "privilege" that the state was 
free to withhold entirely: 
The naked question which we have to determine, therefore, is whether the state 
may impose [an] unconstitutional requirement as a condition precedent to the 
enjoyment of a privilege, which, without so deciding, we shall assume to be 
within the power of the state altogether to withhold if it sees fit to do.so.8 
6. Id. at 111-12,289 S.W. at 3~5 (emphasis added). Although the court ultimately 
reversed Scopes' conviction on the ground that the trial judge-in levying the $100 fine against 
Scopes-had improperly exercised a power reserved to the jury under the state constitution, it 
noted that since Scopes "is no longer in the service of the state •.. , [w]e see nothing to be 
gained by prolonging the life of this bizarre case." /d. at 121,289 S.W. at 367. 
7. 271 u.s. 583 (1926). 
8. /d. at 592-93. 
844 DUKE LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 1970:841 
Concluding that governmental control-unrestrained by any 
limitation of the fourteenth amendment-over the use of state-owned 
roads was a far more menacing power than a more limited prerogative 
simply to decide whether to have such roads at all, the Court 
concluded that the proprietary position of the state did not immunize 
it from the fourteenth amendment: 
It would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state legislation 
which, by words of express divestment, seeks to strip the citizen of rights 
guaranteed by the federal Constitution, but to uphold an act by which the same 
result is accomplished under the guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for a 
valuable privilege which the state threatens otherwise to withhold ..•. If the 
state may compel the surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its 
favor, it may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that 
guarantees embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be 
manipulated out of existence.' 
In 1968, forty-one years after the celebrated trial of John Thomas 
Scopes and after a long series of other cases applying this doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions,10 the Supreme Court corrected the 
9. I d. at 593-94. See also Milwaukee Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407 (1921). "The 
United States may give up the Post Office wben it sees fit, but while it carries it on the usc of the 
mails is almost as mucb as part of free speech as the right to use our tongues." Id. at 437 
(Holmes, J., dissenting). 
10. For a discussion and examination of the doctrine, see R. O'NEIL, THE PRICE OF 
DEPENDENCY: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE WELFARE STATE (1970); French, Unconstitutional 
Conditions: An Analysis, SO GEo. LJ. 234 (1961); Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and 
Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 321 (1935); O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: 
Welfare Benefits with Strings A ttacized, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 443 (1966); Oppenheim, 
Unconstitutional Conditions and State Powers, 26 MICH. L. REV. 176 (1927); Powell, The 
Right to Work for the State, 16 COLUM. L. REV. 99 (1916); Van Alstyne, The Demise of the 
Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1445-49 (1968); 
Comment, Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 144 (1968); Note, 
Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1595 (1960). Leading cases within the past two 
decades expressly applying the doctrine include Goldbctg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) 
(hearing required prior to termination of welfare benefits); Tiuker v. Des Moines School Dist., 
393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (public school student's first amendment rights protected); Pickering 
v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (right of teacher in public school to criticize the 
board of education upheld); Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 386 US. 670,678 (1967) (tenant in 
public housing may not be evicted without being informed of the reasons for the eviction and 
given an opportunity to respond to thechatges); Garrity v. New Jersey,385 U.S.493,500 (1967) 
(state may not force police officers to forego their privilege against self-incrimination in 
connection with investigation of alleged misconduct); Kcyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 
589, 605-06 (1967) (faculty members at public university may not be compelled to surrender all 
first amendment rights); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 379-80 (1964) (first amendment 
freedom of state employees including teachers protected); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,404 
(1963) (state may not abridge unemployment compensation recipient's free exercise of religion); 
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488,495-96 (1961) (requirement that notary public declare his 
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Tennessee court's abandonment of the rights of teachers under the 
Constitution. Reviewing a nearly identical Arkansas statute 
forbidding both the teaching of a theory that mankind ascended or 
descended from a lower order of animals and the use in the public 
schools of any textbook teaching such a theory, 11 the Court concluded 
that the statute was unconstitutional as a law respecting an 
establishment of religion foreclosed to the state by the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment: ''There is and can be no doubt 
that the First Amendment does not permit the State to require that 
teaching and learning must be tailored to the principles or 
prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma." 12 In response to 
Arkansas' claim that it was not restricted by the fourteenth 
amendment in the operation of its own schools or in its relations with 
its own employee-teachers, the Court simply noted that "it is much 
too late to argue that the State may impose upon the teachers in its 
schools any conditions that it chooses, however restrictive they may 
be of constitutional guarantees."13 
In essence, the Constitution had assimilated the simple truth of 
Alexander Hamilton's observation that "[a) power over a man's 
subsistence amounts to a power over his will." 14 That sort of power 
must yield to the Bill of Rights. As a consequence, teachers and 
professors are not bereft of constitutional protection against 
governmental threats of dismissal on grounds which are otherwise 
violative of their substantive constitutional rights. Rather, "[t)o state 
that a person does not have a constitutional right to government 
employment is only to say that he must comply with reasonable, 
lawful, and nondiscriminatory terms laid down by the proper 
authorities."15 In the particular determination of what constitutes 
belief in the existence of God violates the first amendment); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 
5 18 (1958) (first amendment rights of taxpayers protected); Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 
U.S. 551, 555 (1956) (summary dismissal of city school teacher who invoked the privilege 
against self-incrimination before legislative investigating committee prohibited); Wieman v. 
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952) (public employee protected against arbitrary and 
discriminatory action by the state). 
II. ARK. STAT. ANN.§§ 80-1627, 1628 (1960 Replacement) codifying Act No. I, § I, 
[1929] Ark. Acts 50. 
12. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968). 
13. /d. 
14. THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 235 (Fairfield ed. 1966) (A. Hamilton). 
IS. Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551,555 (1956) (emphasis added). The reference 
to "nondiscriminatory" terms of public employment, incidentally: discloses a second principal 
source of substantive constitutional protection: the equal protection clause of the fourteenth 
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"reasonable" conditions, moreover, the trend of the last decade has 
been increasingly to resolve doubtful cases in favor of the teacher 
because of additional considerations of public interest identified with 
his professional security. It is outrageous enough that political 
conformity not justified by compelling exigencies of the moment or by 
the uniq1,1e nature of a particular public office should be demanded of 
any group of employees, private or public, by threats to their jobs, 18 
but the public consequences may be doubly unfortunate if such 
conditions could be imposed on teachers: 
To regard teachers-in our entire educational system, from the primary grades 
to the university-as the priests of our democracy is therefore not to indulge 
in hyperbole . . . . The functions of educational institutions in our national 
life and the conditions under which alone they can adequately perform them 
are at the basis of [constitutional] limitations upon State and National power.n 
The drive of the judicial process has, as a consequence, severely 
restricted the use of political litmus tests for teaching eligibility and 
checked the tendency of school boards and legislatures to police the 
extramural political utterances and private lives of teachers through 
threats to their jobs. Specifically, political disclaimer oaths, bans on 
membership in feared or hated political organizations or unions, 
discharge for extramuraPs criticism, and dismissal or revocation of 
amendment. Protection from arbitrary, invidious, or discriminatory distinctions between those 
considered eligible for teaching and those ineligible to teach proceeds from the assurance of 
equal protection wholly irrespective of whether the opportunity to teach in public institutions is 
one of privilege rather than one of right: ~·we need not pause to consider whether an abstract 
right to public employment exists. It is sufficient to say that constitutional protection docs 
extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitral)' or 
discriminatory." Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 ( 1952). See also Trisler v. University 
of Miss., 420 F .2d 499 (5th Cir. 1969); Johnson v. Branch, 364 F .2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. 
denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967). 
16. For other discussions of the rights of public employees, see Linde, Justice Douglas on 
Freedom in the Welfare State: Constitutional Rights in the Public Sector, 39 WASH. L. REV. 4 
(1964); O'Neil, Public Employment, Antiwar Protest and Preinduction Review, 11 U.C.L.A.L. 
REV. 1028 (1970); Reich, The New Properly, 13 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); Van Alstyne, The 
Constitutional Rights of Public Employees: A Cqmment on the Inappropriate Uses of an Old 
Analogy, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 751 (1969); Comment, The First Amendment and Public 
Employees-An Emerging Constitutional Right to be a Policeman?, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
409 (1968); Note, The Public Employee and Political Activity, 3 SUFFOLK L. REV. 380 (1969). 
17. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196-97 (1952)(Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
18. The phrase "extramural" is used figuratively in reference to statements made outside of 
the employment relationship and not merely to statements made outside the walls of the campus. 
It is perfectly clear that the place where the statement is made, whether on or off campus, is not 
per se determinative of the question whether the teacher is speaking as a private citizen, albeit 
one whose views may presumably be informed by his profession and his association with an 
academic institution. · 
~ ' 
I', 
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teaching certificates for private behavior not specifically shown to 
affect the teacher's professional competency, his intramural working 
relationships, or his classroom integrity gradually have all been 
rolled back by judicial decree.19 
An excellent case law survey of teachers' and professors' 
substantive constitutional rights appears elsewhere and need not be 
imitated here.20 In passing, however, certain of the better settled 
propositions merit restatement: 
I. Membership per se in political organizations, not excluding 
the Communist Party, or economic organizations such as labor 
!unions is not a permissible ground for terminating teachers or 
disqualifying applicants to the profession. Arguably, moreover, not 
even active and knowing membership including some degree of 
personal sympathy for the illegal objectives of the group may be 
sufficient, short of some concrete act in furtherance of an illegal 
objective inconsistent with one's lawful obligations as a teacher.21 
2. Correspondingly, disclaimer oaths requiring that one 
forswear activities or associations he is otherwise constitutionally 
privileged to pursue as a private citizen are beyond the constitutional 
pale. In all likelihood, the state may go no further than to require that 
one be willing to affirm a general commitment to uphold the 
Constitution and faithfully to perform the duties of the position he 
holds.22 
3. While neither the first amendment nor the fifth amendment 
19. See, e.g., Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 
U.S. 589 (1967); Elfbrandt v. ~ussell, 384 U.S. 11 (1965); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 
(1964) (disclaimer oaths and affidavits). See also Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 
(1968) (extramural criticism of the school board protected by the first amendment); 
Mclaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968) (labor union membership protected); 
McConnell v. Anderson, 316 F. Supp. 809 (D. Minn. 1970) (state university may not consti-
tutionally reject teacher's employment application on the basis of his declared homosexuality); 
Morrison v. State Bd. ofEduc., I Cal. 3d 214,461 P.2d 375,82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969)(teacher's 
private homosexual conduct not affecting his performance on the job does not justify revocation 
of his teaching certificate); Finot v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 250 Cal. App. 2d 189,58 Cal. 
Rptr. 520 (1968) (public schoolteacher may not be transferred out of the school for wearing a 
well-trimmed beard in defiance of the principal's ban). 
20. See Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045 (1968). 
21. See cases cited in note 19 supra.Seealso United Statesv. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967).ln 
Robel, the Court stressed the fact that the employee did not occupy a sensitive position, citing 
Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956). For additional cases holding that union membership 
eannot be forbidden, see Orr v. Thorpe, 427 F 2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1970); American Fed'n ofState, 
County & Municipal Employees v. Woodward, 406 F2d 137 (8th Cir. 1969); Atkins v. 
Charlotte,296 F.Supp.i068 (W.D.N.C. 1969). 
22. Ohlson v. Phillips, 304 F. Supp. 1152 (D.Colo.), affdper curiam, 397 U.S. 317 (1970). 
See also Israel, Eljbrandt v. Russell-The Demise of the Oath?, 1966 SuP. CT. REV. 193. 
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entitles a teacher to withhold information when his employer has 
questioned his competence or professional integrity on the basis of 
reasonably specific and creditable allegations of impropriety related 
to his job, information elicited under such circumstances by a public 
employer may not be utilized for purposes of criminal prosecution, 
and vague or general fishing expeditions on mere suspicion are not 
permissible. 23 
Two areas which remain most controversial are the degree of 
protected extramural utterances, especially those utterances that may 
be critical of the school or university itself, and the degree of a 
teacher's freedom within his own classroom. A review of two recent 
Supreme Court decisions may indicate the dimensions of the 
problems. 
In Pickering v. Board of Education,24 the Supreme Court reversed 
the determination of a county board of education which concluded, 
after conducting a full hearing, that the newspaper publication of a 
local teacher's letter-critical of the way in which the board had 
handled proposals to raise new revenue for schools and factually false 
in certain respects-was per se sufficiently harmful to the operation of 
the schools to warrant the teacher's dismissal. The board also took 
the position that the teacher, by virtue of his public employment, "has 
a duty of loyalty to support his superiors in attaining the generally 
accepted goals of education and that, if he must speak out publicly, he 
should do so factually and accurately, commensurate with his 
education and experience."u. In this respect, the board seemed to 
stand on high ground. Even the 1940 Statement of Principles of 
Academic Freedom and Tenure, promulgated by the American 
Association of University Professors and endorsed by more than sixty 
national educational associations, appears to lay this degree of 
constraint at least upon those who teach at the college or university 
level: 
As a man of learning and an educational officer, [the college or university 
teacher] should remember that the public may judge his profession and his , 
23. See, e.g., Sanitation Men v. Sanitation Comm'r, 392 U.S. 280 (1968); Gardner v. 
Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967); Garrity v. New Jersey, 
385 U.S. 493 (1967); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigating Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); 
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 {1957); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 
{1957); Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 {1956); Murray v. Blatchford,307 F. Supp. 
1038 {D.R.I. 1969); Murray v. Vaughn, 300 F. Supp. 688 (D.R.I. 1969). 
24. 391 u.s. 563 {1968). 
25. /d. at 568-69 {emphasis added). 
Vol. 1970:841] TEACHERS' RIGHTS 849 
institution by his utterances. Hence he should at all times be accurate, should 
exercise appropriate restraint, should show respect for the opinions of others, 
and should make every effort to indicate that he is not an institutional 
spokesman.:zc 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court disagreed with the board's dismissal 
of Martin Pickering on constitu,tional grounds: in the absence of 
specific evidence that Pickering's letter had in fact adversely affected 
the operation of the schools, a factually unsupported presumption of 
harm per se could not be used to override the teacher's first 
amendment freedom of speech. Responding to the claim that the 
teacher owed the board a duty of loyalty to avoid public disparge-
ment of its judgment on the operation of the schools, the Court 
observed: 
[f]he question whether a school system requires additional funds is a matter of 
legitimate public concern on which the judgment of the school administration, 
including the School Board, cannot, in a society that leaves such questions to 
popular vote, be taken as conclusive. On such a question free and open debate is 
vital to informed decision-making by the electorate. Teachers are, as a class, 
the members of a community most likely to have informed and definite 
opinions as to how funds allotted to the operation of the schools should be 
spent. Accordingly, it is essential that they be able to speak out freely on such 
questions without fear of retaliatory dismissa1.27 
Thus, even on matters of educational policy where the ultimate 
employer has exercised a proper prerogative in asserting a public 
position of its own, the attenuated employment relation.ofthe teacher 
several times removed from the board may not be used to imply a 
rigid oath of fealty, forswearing all right to extramural dissent-at 
least on issues immediately determined at the polls. Moreover, while 
accuracy and moderation may be desirable standards for a teacher to 
cultivate when moved to enter such dissent, they are not conclusive. 
Where the teacher's dissent concerns an issue which is not so 
intimately associated with his customary duties that his opinion will 
gain remarkable public influence from his presumed access to special 
facts, and where he makes no claim of greater skill or knowledge 
26. Republished in AAUP PouCY DocUMENTS AND REPORTS 2 (Sept. 1969) (emphasis 
added). But see Committee A Statement on Extramural Utterances, id. at 11: "Extramural 
utterances rarely bear upon the faculty member's fitness for his position." 
27. 391 U.S. at 571-72. See also Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 
(M.D. Ala. 1967), vacated as moot, 402 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1968) (student newspaper editor 
dismissed from public university for publishing in another newspaper his disagreement with 
college president on the proper regulation of guest speakers entitled to reinstatement on first 
amendment grounds). 
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associated with his job and neither seeks to trade upon his 
employment relation nor represents that he speaks other than as a 
private citizen, 28 the board may not insist upon the same exacting 
standards of accuracy and professionalism to which the teacher may 
be held accountable in his performance of work properly within the 
employment relationship itself. Where "the fact of employment is 
only tangentially and insubstantially involved in the subject matter of 
the public communication by [the] teacher,"29 the threat to a teacher's 
livelihood for mere carelessness in extramural utterance is 
constitutionally incompatible with the first amendment protection of 
free and unhindered debate on matters of public importance. 
While the Pickering decision thus marks an extremely important 
step in defining the substantive rights of teachers, the Court's careful 
balancing and weighing of competing interests permits further 
refinements as additional cases arise. 3° For instance, dicta in 
Pickering quite clearly indicate that a teacher may not publicly 
ventilate whatever-thoughts he harbors, however deeply felt his need to 
do so, with indifference to certain enforceable constraints specifically 
associated with his position as an employee. In this respect, it is 
instructive to note certain facts which were not involved in Pickering 
to indicate the effect their presence might have on the outcome of 
other cases: 
I. None of the information publicized in Pickering's letter drew 
upon facts that he learned solely as a consequence of his employment. 
Had it done so, the result might have been different: the extramural 
release of information acquired under specific conditions of 
confidentiality might provide a sufficient basis for dismissal on the 
claim that the ability of one's administrative superiors and colleagues 
to exhibit a degree of frankness essential to the operation of the school 
would be impaired if they were forced to operate under the risk that 
28. Pickering signed his letter only with his name. 391 U.S. at 578. 
29. /d. at574. 
30. For recent applications of Pickering, see Muller v. Conlisk, 429 F.2d 901 (7th Cir 1970); 
Roberts v. Lake Central School Corp., 317 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. Ind. 1970); McGee v. Rich-
mond Unified School Dist., 306 F. Supp. 1052 (N.D. Cal. 1969); Brukiewa v. Police Comm'r, 
257 Md. 36, 263 A2d 210 (Ct. App. 1970). See also Pred v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 415 
F 2d 851 (5th Cir. 1969); Turner v. Kennedy, 332 F.2d 304, 306-07 (D.C. Cir.) (dissenting 
opinion), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 901 (1964); Rosenberg v. Allen, 258 F. Supp. 511 (S.D.N.Y. 
1966); Swaaley v. United States, 376 F .2d 857 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Watts v. Seward School Bd., 
421 P.2d 586 (Alas. 1967), vacated per curiam, 391 U.S. 592 (1968),judgment reinstated, 
454 P.2d 732 (Alas. 1969), {:ert. denied, 397 U.S. 921 (1970); Belshaw v. City of Berkeley, 
246 Cal. App. 2d 493, 54 Cal. Rptr. 727 (1966). Board of Trustees v. Owens, 206 Cal. App. 
2d 147,23 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1962). 
'. 
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every memorandum, proposal, policy, or conversation could become 
a subject of instant public notice at the whim of disaffected 
individuals within the institution. 
Should the outcome be different, however, if the information 
released in a deliberate breach of confidence pertained to a subject 
that school authorities were falsely representing to the public, that 
involved an undisclosed policy of the school which was itself illegal, or 
that was clearly a matter which, viewed objectively, was reasonably 
subject to the influence of public judgment and review concerning the 
operation of the school? Pickering is so heavily qualified by the Court 
that it provides no easy answer; neither do recent developments 
in companion areas of the law-administrative law and 
libel-uniformly point in one direction. The first amendment may 
require, however, that an institution which seeks to discipline a 
teacher for the unauthorized disclosure of information acquired solely 
in the course of his employment may do so only pursuant to clear and 
specific rules respecting confidentiality; such rules must likely be of 
narrow compass and serve a compelling institutional interest in order 
to provide substantial justification for the constraints of 
confidentiality .31 Possibly the outcome may even depend upon the 
retrospective ad hoc public importance of the disclosure 
itself-whether it truthfully brought to light a matter of serious 
institutional impropriety which would have gone unattended but for 
the very breach of confidence involved in the employee's conduct, 
assuming of course that the employee had first attempted to raise the 
issue intramurally by whatever means the institution provided.32 The 
public· interest served b.y vindication of the employee's freedom to 
speak out under these circumstances may outweigh whatever 
marginal tendency the result has to inhibit utter frankness in the 
normal operation of the school. Indeed, it is arguable that such 
"frankness" or "secrecy" should be discouraged in any case in order 
to decrease the institution's temptation knowingly to pursue improper 
or illegal internal policies which it would hope to screen from public 
view by some customary in terrorem reliance on rules of in-house 
confidentiality. 
2. The criticism of board policy explicit in Pickering's letter 
31. See Meehan v. Macy, 392 F 2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1968), modified on reconsideration, D.C. 
Cir. No. 20,812, August 23, 1968 (adjustments in light of Pickering). 
32. See Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 66 Cal. 2d 260,425 P2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 
(1967). 
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transcended any purely work-related grievance of his own and did not 
seek some premature advantage of public leverage in the redress of a 
personal complaint. Thus, since its subject bore directly on an issue 
currently before the electorate-consideration of a proposed tax 
increase to be used for educational purposes-the letter served a 
central function of the first amendment; moreover, its publication had 
no tendency to undermine established procedures for the orderly and 
efficient review of individual, work-related complaints. These factors 
may be instructive in two regards. The avoidance of disruption to 
intramural efficiency may support an employment requirement that 
teachers forbear from ignoring established channels for the review and 
redress of work-related grievances and institutional policy and 
similarly forbear from bringing outside pressure to bear upon the 
operation of those institutional processes. Simultaneously, however, 
the failure of an institution to provide adequate internal mechanisms 
for the fair and orderly review of an employee's request to be heard on 
work-related matters, at least to the extent that these matters reflect 
on the overall institutional quality or policies of substantial public 
interest, may entitle him to bring the matter to public attention 
without unreasonable apprehension that such conduct will imperil his 
job. Specifically, the public interest to be served in protecting a 
teacher's freedom to speak in protest and his own right to petition for 
redress or grievances33 must be weighed against the adequacy of 
institutional channels in determining whether efficiency in 
administration fairly requires greater circumspection in his public 
utterances. 
3. The Pickering case did not involve the public airing of 
disagreements between Martin Pickering and anyone with whom he 
was closely associated as a working colleague or subordinate. Indeed, 
the Court explicitly left open the possibility that a teacher could be 
dismissed for publishing a letter so critical of those in immediate 
supervisory contact with him that, whatever its truth, it would 
necessarily lead to intolerable personal relations in the future, 
impairing the efficient operation of the school and requiring that one 
of the employees be transferred or terminated: "Appellant's 
employment relationships with the Board and, to a somewhat lesser 
33. See Turner v. Kennedy, 332 F2d 304 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 90 (1964); 
Jackson v. United States,428 F2d 844 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Klein v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 260 Iowa 
1147,152 N.W.2d 195 (1967). 
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extent, with the superintendent are not the kind of close workmg 
relationships for which it can persuasively be claimed that personal 
loyalty and confidence are necessary to their proper functioning."34 
The point is clear. As one who would "rather be right than be 
President" must also be prepared to relinquish his post in the 
President's cabin~t as the price of·publicly airing his differences with 
the President, teachers in equivalent positions of immediate 
subordinate responsibility cannot expect that the first amendment will 
secure their position against a loss of personal confidence which may 
follow from their public ventilation of every difference in opinion or 
policy judgment between them and their immediate superiors. As 
schools and universities grow in size, independence and specialization 
of employment functions, and impersonalism in working relations, 
however, it is doubtful whether this observation about Pickering 
should properly apply to many situations. 
4. Perhaps the most troublesome qualification on this seminal 
case results from the Cou~'s great stress upon the fact that the letter, 
albeit partly inaccurate, was entirely without public impact and was 
"greeted ... with massive apathy and total disbelief."35 Moreover, 
the Court continued, the inaccuracies involved only items of trivial 
detail not pertaining to matters upon which the public would presume 
·that Pickering had special access or information; he was, at worst, 
merely careless without knowingly or recklessly misrepresenting 
anything. At the same time, the Court did imply that were a teacher's 
extramural, inaccurate utterances made knowingly or with cavalier 
disregard for their truth or falsehood, their publication might .. call 
into question his fitness. to perform his duties in the classroom" and 
serve as some .. evidence of the teacher's general competence, or lack 
thereof'38 even though they still had no effect and were not concerned 
with a subject within the teacher's special skills or range of 
information. 
As a logical exercise, the Court's concession is not without appeal: 
one who is reckless with the truth in any respect may indeed invite 
34. 391 U.S. at 570. See Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Soc'y, 312 F. Supp. 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); 
see also Jones v. Battles, 315 F. Supp. (D. Conn. 1970). In Lefcourt, the court approved the dis-
missal of a legal aid attorney whose criticism of his superiors had a "definite impact on the 
internal operation of the Society" and threatened the "confidence and close working relation-
ship" necessary to the effective operation of the Society./ d. at 1112-13. 
35. 391 U.S.at570. 
36. /d. at 573. 
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some question concerning the degree of care and preparation he 
employs in his professional calling. As a matter of common 
experience, however, the proposition is almost certainly unsound: 
while preserving the most rigorous personal standards within their 
professional specialty, teachers, like others, may occasionally be 
foolish almost beyond belief outside the area of their one particular 
discipline. Beyond this, moreover, if one must fear that even his 
extramural utterances on political matters wholly unrelated to his 
work can be seized upon as the pretext for questioning his entire 
professional competence and standing, his freedom of speech will 
surely be chilled and his teaching against the greater prerogatives of 
other private citizens gravely disadvantaged. In addition, elemental 
considerations of political realism suggest that even reckless 
inaccuracy in extramural expression is in fact unlikely to occasion any 
inquiry into the teacher's classroom competence unless the point of 
the expression offends those with power to press the inquisition. 
Precisely because the Court's suggested standard is too susceptible to 
abuse and misapplication for purposes of retaliatory dismissal, it 
should not be allowed at all. 
Whatever the shortcomings of the Pickering decision, it does 
provide a firm first. step in defining the protected boundaries of a 
teacher's freedom of extramural expression. Unfortunately, however, 
the guidelines are less clear in the only noteworthy decision to date 
respecting the scope of academic freedom within the classroom itself 
and the extent to which the Constitution will protect teaching 
freedom-the prerogative of the teacher to teach his subject according 
to his best professional understanding. The decision is Epperson v. 
A rkansas31 in which the Supreme Court, discerning no reason for a 
statutory prohibition on the consideration of evolutionary theory in 
any state-supported educational institution beyond the legislature's 
desire to accommodate distinctly religious interests, condemned the 
statute as a violation of the religious establishment clause of the first 
amendment. The decision is not entirely satisfactory even on its own 
terms, since the Court has seldom upset a law because of misgivings 
about the motives of those who enacted it; rather, the Court has 
sustained the law if it possibly serves any permissible objective.38 And, 
37. 393 u.s. 97 (1968). 
38. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382-86 (1968). "It is a familiar 
principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional 
statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive." /d. at 383. 
For an extremely able treatment of the role oflegislative motivation in constitutional law, see 
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as Mr. Justice Black observed in his concurring opinion, the 
prohibition may have been adopted merely to remove a subject of 
endlessly disruptive controversy from further consideration within the 
public schools,39 an arguably permissible objective. 
More. importantly, however, the decision placed no reliance upon 
any constitutional claim of the individual biology teacher to some 
personal degree of academic freedom in the presentation of the subject 
she had been employed to teach. To the contrary, at several points 
individual Justices broadly implied that no constitutional support 
exists for such a claim in the face of the power of the state to designate 
the content of state-supported curricula. Thus, Mr. Justice Black 
declared: 
[f]here is no reason I can imagine why a State is without power to withdraw 
from its curriculum any subject deemed too emotional and controversial for its 
public schools. 
I am also not ready to hold that a person hired to teach school children 
takes with him into the classroom a constitutional right to teach sociological, 
economic, political, or religious subjects that the school's managers do not 
want discussed. . . . 
I question whether ..... academic freedom" permits a teacher to breach 
his contractual agreement to teach only the subjects designated by the school 
authorities who hired him .... [I]t is doubtful that, sitting in Washington, 
[this Court] can successfully supervise and censor the curriculum of every 
public school in every hamlet and city in the United States. I doubt that our 
wisdom is so nearly infallible}8 • 
The difficulty, however, is not stated with complete fairness when 
presented in such broad dilemmatic terms. One may readily concede 
that the contending preferences of teachers, students, parents, and the 
members of an elected board of education must necessarily be dis-
tilled into overall curricular decisions by some group with ultimate 
responsibility; among these groups, authority to make such decisions 
logically devolves upon the more democratically accountable board 
or, as a general reeourse, upon the legislature. They, at least, are 
subject to the orderly and formal check of the electoral process, the 
informal influences of various groups including P.T.A.s, student 
organizations, professional education associations and teacher 
Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law. 19 YALE L.J. 1205 
(1970). 
39. 393 U.S. at 112-13. 
40. /d. at 112-14. 
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unions, and the admonitions of the federal Constitution such as the 
establishment clause of the first amendment. Moreover, the school 
classroom and, albeit to a distinctly lesser extent, the university 
classroom are not at all free and voluntary forums in which the 
remunerated teacher may appropriately assert the same full measure 
of his own freedom of speech available to him as a citizen in private 
life. Students compelled by law to attend classes constitute a wholly 
captive audience neither free to depart if offended by, or in 
disagreement with, the teacher's utterances nor free even genuinely to 
offer dissenting views against the presumed authority of the teacher, 
armed with his command of sanctions over classroom decorum, the 
awarding of grades, and the dispensing of personal recommendations. 
The teacher receives a salary for his hired service; he is employed for a 
specific task; and he is insulated within his classroom even from the 
immediate competition of different views held by others equally 
steeped in the same academic discipline. Indeed, the use of his 
classroom by a teacher or professor deliberately to proselytize for a 
personal cause or knowingly to emphasize only that selection of data 
best conforming to his own personal biases is far beyond the license 
granted by the freedom of speech and furnishes precisely the just 
occasion to question his fitness to teach.41 
If these considerations are sufficient to forbid the teacher to 
impose his own orthodoxy upon his students, however, they apply 
with equal force when the prescription for biased treatment of a given 
subject or the mandate to use the classroom as an instrument of 
ideological proselytism is fashioned by a legislature or a school board 
instead-a legislature or school board that so rigidly determines the 
exact and preselected details of each course that in fact it employs the 
teacher as a mere meehanical instrument of its impermissible design. 
For instance, it may be relatively unimportant that Commager's high 
school text on American history is uniformly purchased in bulk and 
prescribed as the basic text in high school civics in lieu of a similar 
text by Jones or Smith unless its particular selection plus detailed 
proscriptions of any classroom reference to other texts, other 
impressions, and other historical ideas cumulatively combine to 
describe a process of unfree education and academic indoctrination. 
41. See, e.g., Goldwasser v. Brown, 417 F.2d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1969); In re Charles James, 
N.Y. Comm'r of Educ. No. 1895 (Sept. 23, 1970) (dismissal upheld for repeated usc of 
classroom by teacher to intcJjcct his personal views on a political issue unrelated to the regular 
subject matter). 
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Indeed, arbitrary restrictions on alternative sources of information or 
opinion, resulting not from understandable budgetary constraints or 
the restraints upon the time available for study by teachers and 
students, are precisely what the first amendment disallows. Against a 
school board decree requiring the inculcation of one theory and 
forbidding mention or examination of another, for instance, a mere 
taxpayer should have standing to contest his compelled financial 
support for the propagation of ideas to which he is opposed: .. [1] can 
think of few plainer, more direct abridgments of the freedoms of the 
First Amendment than to compel persons to support . . . ideologies 
or causes that they are against."42 Against a state law provision that a 
student might be disciplined for consulting any source of education 
save that prescribed in regimented detail, the student could also 
succeed on a first amendment claim ... In our system students may not 
be regarded as the closed-circuit recipients of only that which the 
State chooses to communicate." 43 Correspondingly, neither must 
teachers or professors en_dure similarly arbitrary restrictions in the 
course of their own inquiries or upon their own communicated 
classroom references. One may not, as a condition of his employment, 
be made an implement of governmental practices which are 
themselves violative of the first amendment. Accordingly, a teacher 
violating a statutory restriction forbidding reference to, or 
consideration of, a source of opinion or information otherwise within 
the proper compass of his subject should be as much shielded by the 
first amendment from prosecution or dismissal as a social worker 
refusing to conduct a midnight search forbidden to the state by the 
fourth amendment." Concurring in Epperson, Mr. Justice Stewart 
more nearly recognized the presence of important first amendment 
issues beyond the valid but limited reach of the religious 
establishment clause: 
It is one thing for a State to determine that "the subject of higher mathem?tics,_ 
or astronomy, or biology" shall or shall not be included in its public school 
curriculum. 1 t is quite another thing for a State to make it a criminal offense 
for a public school teacher so much as to mention the very existence of an entire 
system of respected human thought. That kind of criminal law, I think, would 
clearly impinge upon the guarantees of free communication contained in the 
First Amendment. . . .45 
42. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820,873 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). 
43. Tinkerv. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,511 (1969). 
44. Cf. Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 
(l961).Seea/so R. O'NEIL, supra note 9, at 81-83. 
45. 393 U.S. at 116. 
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In one of the last of the political litmus-test cases, the Court quite 
appropriately recalled the rhetoric of Judge Learned Hand: "The 
Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure 
to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a 
multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative 
selection.' " 46 Within the very classrooms where the· nation's future 
leaders are trained, no robust exchange at all would be possible if the 
State were constitutionally free to select just one view of any given 
subject and to instruct its teachers to avoid mention or consideration 
of any other. Consistent with the constitutional sense of Judge Hand's 
declaration, therefore, it must simply follow that no teacher or 
professor may be subjected to dismissal for refusing to yield to such 
an authoritarian demand. It is a pity that the Court in Epperson 
declined the opportunity more specifically to reaffirm the pointY 
PRETERMINATION PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 
"The history of liberty," Mr. Justice Frankfurter once observed, 
"has largely been the history of observance of procedural 
safeguards." 48 The point is especially well taken with respect to 
teachers: assuming that a given teacher's employment may not be 
terminated or discontinued on grounds offensive to the Bill of Rights, 
in theory, the difficulty of ascertaining the basis of a termination 
decision and of securing redress after the fact will-to the extent of the 
difficulty-effectively nullify the substantive protection itself. 
Suppose, for instance, that a public school teacher on annual 
contract simply fails to receive any notice that his teaching contract is 
being renewed for the coming year. Or suppose that an assistant 
46. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603( 1968). 
47. At least three federal courts have recently extended constitutional protection to classroom 
assignment and discussion prerogatives of a teacher's academic freedom. See Keefe v. 
Geanakos, 418 F2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 
1970); Vought v. Van Buren Pub. Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Mich. 1969). See also 
Parker v. Board of Educ., 237 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md.), affd, 348 F.2d 464, cerl. denit'd, 382 
U.S. 1030 (1965); R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC 
FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES 386-87 (1955): 
By Lehrfreiheit [the German term for academic freedom], the German educator meant 
two things: He meant that the university professor was free to examine bodies of evidence 
and to report his findings in lecture or published form-that he enjoyed freedom of 
teaching and freedom of inquiry ...• In addition, Lehrfreiheil ... also denoted the 
paucity of administrative rules within the teaching situation: the absence of a prescribed 
syllabus •.•. 
48. McNabb v. Unted States, 318 U.S. 332,347 (1943). 
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professor in a state college receives notice that his three-year contract 
is not being renewed and, upon inquiry, is advised that it is contrary to 
institutional practice to provide a statement of reasons under such 
circumstances. Or suppose that a full professor in a state whose 
legislature has neither adopted a tenure system nor even delegated 
authority to the state regents to provide one receives notice in midyear . 
that his service will terminate the following June. In each case, the 
teacher may believe that one of the reasons significantly contributing 
to his termination involved a standard forbidden by the Bill of Rights 
such as a response to a protected extramural utterance or retaliation 
for a disfavored political affiliation. Alternatively, he may vaguely 
suspect that false gossip of his private life or groundless rumors about 
his teaching, factors which he is convinced were utterly without 
foundation, contributed to the decision. Or again, he may simply be 
genuinely puzzled about the reasons for his dismissal. In the absence 
of procedural safeguards antecedent to the effective date of his 
termination, the substantive protection he presumably enjoys may be 
altogether lost. 
If he is possessed of extraordinary fortitude, he may in these 
straits retain private counsel to file suit in a state or federal court, 
alleging that the action taken against him was based on certain 
constitutionally prohibited grounds. Then, he may seek to invoke the 
court's assistance for discovery purposes, more definitely to ascertain 
the reasons and evidence leading to his termination, and thereafter 
attempt to prove at his own expense the infringement of his 
substantive constitutional or statutory rights. On that basis, he may 
eventually recover damages, be reinstated by court order, or at least 
secure the useful judicial declaration that the institution, rather than 
he, was at fault. 49 
In view of the practical difficulties of litigation, however, it is not 
surprising that there have been vastly fewer such successful cases than, 
for instance, the number of cases which the American Association of 
University Professors' annual cascade of investigative reports have 
considered meritorious in point of fact. Faculty members are not 
litigious by nature, the costs of formal controversy are high and 
usually must be borne personally, the burden of proof-often 
exceedingly difficult to carry-falls upon the plaintiff-teacher, and the 
49. The appropriate federal statutes for a federal action alleging violation of constitutional 
rights in this situation are28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(3), 1343(4)(1964) and42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 
1985(3) (1964). 
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ordinary case may not reach judgment for months or even years after 
the plaintiff has been separated from his job. In addition, the teacher 
must face the practical recognition that the extralegal hazards of such 
litigation are themselves quite great: to sue and to lose establishes a 
public record against oneself as a teacher and may further prejudice 
one's chances for employment or advancement. To sue and to win will 
not permit one actually to resume teaching at the institution in most 
instances, and it will almost certainly spread upon the public record 
whatever evidence of the plaintiffs shortcomings the defending 
institution can muster-thereby warning other institutions which may 
be chary of seemingly irascible professors who sue their employer and 
·~launder their linen" in public places. 
Without question, therefore, the effective protection of the 
substantive constitutional rights of teachers and professors may 
critically depend upon the availability of pretermination procedural 
due process. Post-termination judicial remedies for teachers, like 
post-suspension remedies for students50 or post-eviction remedies for 
tenants,51 are often simply too little and too late. IncJ,eed, by analogy 
to these other areas of remedial concern, the courts have gradually 
recognized a separate constitutional right to pretermination 
procedural due process. 
The source of a teacher's constitutional right to pretermination 
procedutal due process may be found in a variety of places. The most 
obvious location is the necessary procedural implication of each and 
every substantive constitutional right which government is forbidden 
to deny or to abridge even when it acts as an employer. To the extent 
that the first amendment forbids a public institution to terminate a 
teacher's employment because of some extramural utterance, for 
instance, the amendment itself may necessarily establish some degree 
of entitlement to the protection of an effective pretermination 
procedure sufficient to arrest the substantive violation before it can 
take hold. To the extent that the institution need not state a reason for 
its decision to terminate, and post-termination judical proceedings 
necessarily prove to be grossly inadequate as a deterrent or corrective 
of a first amendment violation concealed in the institution's decision, 
the first amendment itself implicitly affords the right to a 
50. See Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. ofEduc., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 
930(1961) (public university students may not be indefinitely suspended in the absence of 
pretermination procedural due process). 
51. SeeThorpev. Housing Authority, 386 U.S. 670 (1967) (per curiam). 
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pretermination hearing or at least to some right of efficacious 
intramural or administrative review sufficient to assure the timely 
protection of freedom of speech. Similarly, to the extent that the equal 
protection clause protects a teacher from termination on grounds 
which are "patently arbitrary or discriminatory," adequate 
protection from such a denial of substantive equal protection requires 
a right of access to a degree and form of pretermination procedural 
due process essential to determine and to abate the substantive 
violation. The point is straightforward and reasonably self-evident. 
Were the courts to continue to declare on the one hand that the 
teacher has a substantive freedom from discriminatory termination 
decisions and yet, on the other hand, deny that he is entitled to the 
minimum procedural due process essential to the effective and timely 
vindication of that freedom, the law would indeed be cruelly cynical: 
"Such a result in effect nullifies the substantive right-not to be 
arbitrarily injured by Government-which the Court purports to 
recognize. What sort of right is it which enjoys absolutely no 
procedural protection?"52 
Once provided by law, moreover, a second source of substantive 
rights may also imply a degree of constitutional entitlement to 
whatever form of procedural due process is essential to their 
protection as well-rights affirmatively established by statute, 
administrative order, or the common law. Where the state has chosen 
to protect one's status beyond the minimum required by the Bill of 
Rights by providing, for example, that teaching contracts shall be 
renewed or continued except on certain specified grounds such as 
incompetence, medical disability, or insubordination, one's statutory 
right to continued employment may imply an entitlement to whatever 
degree of procedural due process is essential to insure the protection of 
that statutory right.53 
A third basis for an independent constitutional requirement of 
procedural due process may exist when the proposed action of the 
government would do more than terminate the individual and would, 
in addition, inflict an injury on some aspect of his personal liberty of 
52. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,900 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
53. "[Appellant] is entitled to have procedural due process observed in the protection of these 
substantive rights even though substantive due process would not compel the rights to be given." 
United States ex rei. Smith v. Baldi, 192 F.2d 540, 544 (3d Cir. 1951), affd, 344 U.S. 561 
(1953). See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 97 U.S. 254 (1970); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 
(1959); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 185 (1951); Homer v. 
Richmond,292 F.2d719, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1961). 
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which he may not be deprived without due process. Thus, where 
institutional conduct injurious to the teacher's personal standing 
apart from the loss of his job-for example, dismissal on published 
grounds of racial bigotry-accompanies termination, the teacher's 
right to protection of his personal reputation entitles him to the 
observance of procedural due process as a precondition to 
governmental deprivation of that aspect of his personal liberty. 
"[W]henever there is a substantial interest, other than employment by 
the state, involved in the discharge of a public employee, he can be 
removed neither on arbitrary grounds nor without a procedure 
calculated to determine whether legitimate grounds do exist."~ In an 
entirely complementary fashion, where government induces a private 
person to commit himself and to establish a dependency subject only 
to a given number of express and implied risks which the individual 
assumes, a subsequent decision to terminate him on other bases 
disadvantages him beyond this loss of his job as such; indeed, it leaves 
him far worse off than had he not been induced to accept government 
employment in the first instance. Termination does not leave one's 
economic situation as it was in the absence of the original 
employment opportunity: 
Inter"ruption of an existing relationship between the government and a 
contractor places the latter in a different posture from one initially seeking 
government contracts and can carry with it grave economic consequences. 
We need not resort to [a] colorful term such as "stigma" to characterize the 
consequences of such governmental action, for labels may blur the issues. 
Thus to say that there is no "right" to government contracts does not resolve 
the question of justiciability. Of course there is no such right; but that cannot 
mean that the government can act arbitrarily, either substantively or 
procedurally, against a person or that such person is not entitled to challenge 
the processes and the evidence before he is officially declared ineligible ... ,GS 
Again, therefore, a government employee's "right" not to be 
economically disadvantaged by government on grounds other than 
those propery expressed or implied in response to governmental 
54. Birnbaum v. Trussell, 371 F2d 672, 678 (2d Cir. 1966) (emphasis added). See also K. 
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES 154-55 (1965). 
55. Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F2d 570,574 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (emphasis added) (opinion by 
Burger, holding that an interpretation of the Administrative Procedure Act favorable to the 
claimant made it unnecessary to decide whether the Constitution itself required some 
pretennination adjudicative due process). 
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inducement may necessarily imply a modicum of procedural due 
process essential to protect that right. 
Finally, an independent right to procedural due process may be 
found in the accumulating judicial recognition that one's status in the 
public sector is itself a form of "liberty" or "property" which, while 
subject to forfeiture as any other aspect of liberty pursuant to strict 
procedural safeguards, nevertheless is an interest not to be divested 
without adequate procedural safeguards to minimize unreasonable 
risks of error or prejudice. 56 Sinc.e 1961, for instance, the federal 
courts have taken the position that a student receiving a state 
subsidized education for which he performs no productive service in 
return57 may not be dismissed from college absent a high degree of 
pretermination procedural due process. Eschewing the word-loaded 
dilemma of characterizing a student's status as one of "right" or 
"privilege" for the purpose of determining the minimum procedure to 
which he is entitled under the fourteenth amendment before his status 
may be altered, one court has observed: 
Whether the interest involved be described as a right or a privilege, the fact 
remains that it is an interest of almost incalculable value, especially to those 
students who have already enrolled in the institution and begun the pursuit of 
their college training. Private interests are to be evaluated under the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not in terms of labels or fictions, but in 
terms of their true significance and worth.58 
While there is no equivalent case law support developing the extent of 
pretermination procedural due process for teachers, their 
commensurate entitlement should be self-evident. ''[W]ith respect to 
the right to procedural due process, the protection to be afforded a 
professor can hardly".be less than that afforded a student, and 
probably should be greater."5» 
Emphasis of these preliminary points on the just claim of teachers 
to pretermination procedural due process has been essential simply 
because of the paucity of cases. Practically all of the successful 
56. For a discussion of the property theory of defeasible interests in the public sector, see 
Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare, The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 
1255 (19.65) (favorably noted by Mr. Justice Brennan in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,262 
n.8 (1970)); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). For a brief description of the 
liberty theory of defeasible interests in the public sector, see Developments in the 
Law-Academic Freedom, supra note 20, at 1081. 
57. Maintenance of grades and observance of rules are continuing conditions of his 
attendance but hardly the bargained-for economic exchange of a contract. 
58. Knight v.State Bd. ofEduc.,200 F.Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961). 
59. Laffertyv.Carter,310 F. Supp.465,470 (W.O. Wis. 1970). 
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litigation by teachers has been limited solely to establishing protection 
from certain grounds of termination-nonrenewal, nonrehiring, or 
nonhiring. Because the post-injury judicial processes are massively 
inadequate to avoid the use of such grounds in fact, however, the 
tentative elaboration of pretermination procedural due process for 
teachers now appears to be at least equally critical in the evolving law 
of teachers' rights. 
While the Supreme Court has not yet held unequivocally that 
either a tenured professor or a probationary public school teacher is 
entitled to any degree of constitutionally-compelled pretermination 
procedural due process, recognition of the proposition appears 
reasonably certain. In 1956, the Court's dictum in reversing the 
summary termination of a tenured public university professor noted 
the absence of any orderly inquiry into his continuing fitness or 
competence to hold his job and declared that .. the summary dismissal 
of appellant violates due process of law."60 In 1970, the Court cited 
the same case for the proposition that ''procedural due process must 
be afforded" one who faces discharge from public employment.61 The 
central thesis appears nearly to have won the day, and the critical, 
remaining issue involves a determination of the extent and form of 
procedural due process on a case-by-case basis. 
Two principal considerations should be borne in mind in the 
particular elaboration of pretermination procedural due process for 
teachers. The first is that the right to procedural due process does not 
contemplate a single, frozen, stylized method of trial-type procedure 
irrespective of the subject in controversy or the gravity of the 
outcome. The second consideration, a corollary to the first, is that the 
particular degree and form of procedural due process constitutionally 
required in a given situation is determined by means of a juducial 
"cost-benefit" analysis which weighs the predicament of the 
individual against the costs to society in moving only with required 
ponderous formality. While certain requirements-notice and, to a 
lesser extent, an opportunity to be heard-are fairly characteristic of 
most constitutionally-compelled proceedings, the configuration of 
most other procedural rights is determined by a complex of particular 
cost-benefit concerns. A rather full panoply of particular procedural 
rights might, for instance, include all of the following: 
60. Slochowerv. Board ofEduc., 350 U.S. 551,559 (1956}. 
61. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397. U.S. 254, 262-63 ( 1970} (emphasis added}. 
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1 . Terminal action may not be taken other than pursuant to 
regularly established rules or standards which have been made 
available to the employee ·and which are reasonably precise and clear. 
2. Proceedings to terminate the employee must be preceded by 
specific notice of charges providing a statement of facts sufficient to 
warrant the action contemplated. Adequate time must be provided to 
enable the employee to prepare for the ensuing hearing, and a list of 
witnesses plus access to other evidence proposed for introduction at 
the hearing must be made available to him on request. 
3. The hearing must be held before an impartial trier of fact, the 
1
outcome of the hearing determined solely on the basis of material 
placed in evidence in the course of the hearing, and a record must be 
made of the proceedings. 
4. The employee may be represented by counsel present during 
the proceedings; the employer must provide notice that counsel will be 
furnished upon request in the event the employee is unable to retain 
counsel. 
5. The employee is entitled to know the evidence offered against 
him, to confront adverse witnesses, to conduct cross-examination 
either personally or through counsel, to offer evidence and witnesses in 
his own behalf, and to testify in his own behalf or decline to do so 
within the privilege against self-incrimination. 
6. The teacher may appeal an adverse decision by briefs and oral 
argument, based on the record, with the scope of review de novo on 
alleged errors of law (that is, an incorrect interpretation of the 
allegedly infringed rule) and limited on findings of fact to determine 
whether they are supported by substantial evidence in the record 
considered as a whole. 
In fact, however, probably no instance of teacher termination 
would activate all of these possible procedural rights as a matter of 
constitutional law, and the particular combination of any two or 
more of them will vary in an extraordinary fashion depending upon a 
number of considerations: 
"Due process" is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries are undefinable, and 
its content varies according to specific factual contexts . . . . Whether the 
Constitution requires that a particular right obtain in a specific proceeding 
depends upon a complexity of factors. The nature of the alleged right involved, 
the nature of the proceeding, and the possible burden on that proceeding, are all 
considerations which must be taken into account.82 
62. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960). See also id. at 487-88 (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
866 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1970:841 
[D]ue process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a 
fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances. 
The precise nature of the interest that has been adversely affected, the 
manner in which this was done, the reasons for doing it, the available 
alternatives to the procedure that was followed, the protection implicit in the 
office of the functionary whose conduct is challenged, the balance of hurt 
complained of and good accomplished-these are some of the considerations 
that must enter into thejudicialjudgment.63 
Without question; however, the degree of pretermination 
procedural due process to which a public employee is entitled is most 
heavily influenced in favor of the employee by the degree of total 
hardship which may ensue as a consequence of that termination. 
Where the hardship may be great, the need for procedural safeguards 
against the risks of error and prejudice is correspondingly high. 
In Greene v. McE/roy, 64 for instance, the Court noted that 
revocation of a security clearance without a full hearing had 
effectively deprived an aeronautical engineer of the opportunity to 
pursue his long-established career not only with the particular private 
manufacturer who discharged him solely as consequence of the 
government's action65 but with virtually all other employers offering 
jobs at his skill level. As a result of the government's action, Greene 
was forced to take other work at a greatly reduced skill level and at 
one-fourth of his former pay. Considerably influenced by 
constitutional considerations, the Supreme Court held that the 
security clearance revocation based on statements by unidentified 
informants, depriving the employee of "the traditional procedural 
safeguards .. of confrontation and cross-examination," 88 was not 
authorized by federal statute.67 The case is especially instructive, since 
the Court was obliged to balance the employee's need for information 
against the government's interest not only in national security but in 
the protection of confidential sources who might be unwilling to 
provide critical information should disclosure of their names and 
testimony be required. 
63. Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951) (concurring 
opinion). 
64. 360 u.s. 474 (1959). 
65. The employer discharged the engineer because his access to classified information, 
foreclosed by the government's action, was essential to the performance of his job. 
66. 360 U.S. at493. 
67. /d. at508.Seealso Parkerv. Lester,227 F.2d 708,720 (9th Cir. 1955). 
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In contrast, the Court's five-to-four decision three years later in 
Cafeteria Workers v. McE/roy68 upheld exclusion of a short-order 
cook from the cafeteria of a gun factory upon the Commandant's 
unilateral decision, without any notice or hearing, that the employee 
failed.to meet security requirements. Noting that the employee had 
already secured equivalent employment elsewhere, that the exclusion 
had not affected equivalent employment opportunities in general, and 
that the basis of the decision implied little stigma,89 a slim majority 
held that neither notice nor an. opportunity to be heard was 
constitutionally required. 
The great weight of the "hardship" factor in the rationing of 
procedural due process is also well illustrated in several recent 
Supreme Court decisions outside the employment field. In Goldberg 
v. Kelly,1° the Court held unconstitutional the termination of welfare 
benefits prior to an evidentiary hearing which was otherwise 
elaborately provided following termination. Noting the critical 
consequences of termination to the person left totally destitute, the 
Court concluded that despite the potentially high costs to 
government-loss of money to recipients who would be judgment 
proof against recovery of payments illegally received, administrative 
burdens and costs of providing a hearing, and the tendency to ignore 
ineligible recipients rather than undergo the nuisance of 
pretermination hearings-procedural due process would require 
"timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed 
termination, and an effective opportunity to defend by confronting 
any adverse witnesses and by presenting his own arguments and 
evidence orally. " 71 
In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp./2 the Court held that the 
requirements of procedural due process command that ~ wage earner 
receive notice and an opportunity to be heard in court prior to the 
freezing of one-half of her wages attached by an alleged creditor, even 
though the employer simply intended to hold the attached wages 
subject to the order of the court following the later full trial of the 
creditor's claim. The hardship to the wage earner in the loss of even 
68. 367 u.s. 886 (1961). 
69. "[f]he Superintendant may have simply thought that Rachel Brawner was garrulous, or 
careless with her identification badge." I d. at 899. 
70. 397 u.s. 254 (1970). 
71./d.at267-68. 
72. 395 u.s. 337 (1969). 
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one-half of her means of support, plus the coercive effect of the freeze 
to force a settlement without contesting the creditor's claim in an 
ensuing hearing, were grave enough consequences to require notice 
and an opportunity to be heard in court in advance. 
In In re Gault/3 the state's considerable interest in preserving the 
informal and nonadversary nature of juvenile delinquency proceedings 
was subordinated to the needs of the threatened youngster who, were 
he found delinquent, could be incarcerated for years. Thus, the Court 
determined that the juvenile's right to procedural due process required 
specific notice of alleged particular misconduct, representation by 
counsel, adversary proceedings in court, and the availability of the 
privilege against self-incrimination-all as essential constitutional 
requirements to avoid "unfairness to individuals and inadequate· or 
inaccurate findings of fact and unfortunate prescriptions of 
remedy ."74 
In Jenkens v. McKeithen/5 a state criminal investigatory 
commission, without any prosecuting or formal sanctioning power 
but with authority to determine and publish its official opinion 
concerning the guilt of those charged with criminal misconduct, was 
required "to afford a person being investigated the right to confront 
and cross-examine the witnesses against him, subject only to 
traditional limitations of those rights"7& as well as the right to present 
his own position personally and through witnesses. The public stigma 
to a person under investigation was itself virtually enough to activate 
fair substantial procedural rights on behalf of the individual.77 
These cases clearly suggest that the hardships to the individual 
which provide a partial measure of the degree of antecedent 
procedural due process to which he is entitled necessarily embrace not 
only the loss of his particular status immediately placed in jeopardy 
by the employer-such as his job-but also the probable impact on 
his opportunities elsewhere and the larger repercussions to his 
reputation as well. 
In the teaching field, moreover, significant public interests allied 
with the teacher's interests further tip the balance in favor of 
73. 387 U.S. I (1967}. 
74. /d. at 19-20. 
15. 395 u.s. 411 (1969}. 
76. /d.at429. 
77. Cf. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S.420 (1960). 
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pretermination procedural safeguards.78 It is, in fact, a false view of 
the matter to suppose that the proper balance is merely one of 
weighing the needs of the individual against the needs of society -a 
balance which would nearly always assure from the outset that the 
individual's interest would weigh more lightly. While the Supreme 
Court has not yet given a separate constitutional status to academic 
freedom as such,79 it has nevertheless repeatedly emphasized that the 
protection of individual teachers is critical to protect the public 
interest in teaching, research, investigation, publication, and 
education itself and that procedural due process for teachers is critical 
to the public stake in intellectual pluralism and the advancement of 
knowledge. As a consequence, the balance to be struck in 
apportioning requirements of procedural due process is not one of 
choosing between the needs and rights of the individual and those of 
the state, but between certain proper concerns of the state and certain 
very substantial public interests directly served by protecting those 
who teach from arbitrary !]ecisions: 
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which 
is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. 
78. Mr. Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 134 
(1959), is especially instructive on this point. In Barenblatt, the majority sustained the 
conviction of a former graduate student who had refused to answer the questions of a 
congressional investigative committee concerning his present or past Communist affiliations, 
thereby violating a federal statute which made it a misdemeanor for a witness before such a 
committee to refuse to answer any question pertinent to the inquiry. Disclaiming the majority's 
balancing of the petitioner's freedom of speech against the government's right to "preserve 
itself," Mr. Justice Black asserted that "laws directly abridging First Amendment freedoms 
can[ not) be justified by a congressional or judicial balancing process." /d. at 141. Moreover, he 
continued: 
But even assuming ... that some balancing is proper ... I feel that the Court after 
stating the test ignores it completely .... [I ]t completely leaves out the real interest in 
Barcnblatt's silence, the interest of the people as a whole in being able to join 
o-ganizations, advocate causes and make political "mistakes" without later being 
subjected to governmental penalties for having dared to think for themselves . . .. This 
result ..• is doubly crucial when it affects the universities, on which we must largely rely 
for the experimentation and development of new ideas essential to our country's welfare. 
It is these interests of society, rather than Barcnblatt's own right to silence, which ... 
the Court should put on the balance against the demands of the Government . . . .I d. at 
144. 
79. See Fellman, Academic Freedom in American Law, 1961 Wis. L. REV. 3; Murphy, 
Academic Freedom-An Emerging Constitutional Right, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 447 
(1963). For other selected writing on academic freedom and tenure, see C. BYSE & L. JOUGHIN, 
TENURE IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION (1959); R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES (1955); R. KIRK, ACADEMIC 
FREEDOM (1955); R. MACIVER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN OUR TIME (1955); Machlup, On Some 
Misconceptions Concerning Academic Freedom, 41 A.A.U.P. BULL. 753 (1955); Symposium, 
AcademicFreedom,28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.429 et seq. (1963). 
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That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which 
does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. "The 
vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the 
community of American schools." ... The classroom is peculiarly the 
"marketplace of ideas." The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained 
through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 
"out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative 
selection."80 
We may therefore reasonably expect that the courts will acknowledge 
constitutionally compelled pretermination procedural rights of 
teachers with at least as much generosity as in the case of other public 
employees. A federal district court recently held that a 59-year-old 
university maintenance mechanic with fourteen years of service could 
not be dismissed for allegedly assaulting his supervisor and 
threatening others without "advance written notice [of specific 
charges] with the opportunity to respond either in writing or by an 
informal appearance,"81 even though he was otherwise assured of an 
elaborate post-termination process of administrative review. One may 
readily suppose that pretermination notice and opportunity to be 
heard are at least equally required procedural requisites for professors 
at the same university. Similarly, since a federal court of appeals has 
recently held that a part-time attending physician may not be 
dismissed from a municipal hospital and stigmatized by an allegation 
of racism in the absence of a "full hearing" preceded by a reasonably 
precise and specific written statement of reasons for the proposed 
action,82 termination of a teacher on alleged grounds similarly 
detrimental to his career and reputation may surely require at least the 
same extent of pretermination procedural due process. 
Within the past year, several federal court decisions have fulfilled 
specific prophecies of a professorial right to pretermination 
procedural due process. They have done so, moreover, where the 
teachers were merely probationary appointees, early in their careers, 
on short-term contracts, and termination occurred simply from notice 
of nonrenewal furnished well in advance of the end of the term. 
In Roth v. Board of Regents,83 an assistant professor on a one-
80. Keyishian v. Board of Regenls, 385 U.S. 580, 603 (1968) (emphasis added). See also 
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,487 (1961); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,261-63 
(1957); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196-98 (1952). 
81. Olson v. Regenls,301 F. Supp.l356, 1361 (D. Minn. 1969). 
82. Birnbaum v. Trussell, 371 F2d 672,679 (2d Cir. 1966). · 
83. 310 F. Supp. 972 (W.Q. Wis. 1970). Accord, Sindermann v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939 (5th Cir. 
1970); Ferguson v. Thomas,430 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1970). 
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year contract, without tenure and in his first year of teaching, was 
notified by the state university president five months before the end of 
the academic year that his employment contract would not be 
renewed. In spite of the teacher's youth, his slight dependency on his 
job in the very first year, the absence of any published ground 
stigmatizing his reputation or character, the absence of evidence 
specifically indicating grave personal hardship in finding employment 
elsewhere, the fact that the contract was only for one year and was 
simply not renewed rather than being terminated during the term, the 
obvious needs of the institution to reserve discretion in judging the 
performance and excellence of probationary appointees before 
committing itself to tenure, and the institution's concern that the 
ordeal of elaborate procedures in mere nonrenewal cases might well 
force upon it a system of instant tenure with the cost to society of 
insulating mediocrity, the court concluded that pretermination 
procedural due process would require the following minimum rights: 
I. A statement of the reasons why the university intends not to 
retain him, to be furnished upon his request; 
2. Notice of a hearing at which he may respond to the stated 
reasons, to be provided upon his request: 
At such a hearing the professor must have a reasonable opportunity to submit 
evidence relevant to the stated reasons. The burden of going forward and the 
burden of proof rests with the professor. Only if he makes a reasonable 
showing that the stated reasons are wholly inappropriate as a basis for decision 
or that they .are wholly. without basis in fact would the university 
administration become obliged to show that the stated reasons are not 
inappropriate or that they have a basis in fact.84 
Within three weeks··of Roth, a federal district court in Alabama 
held that several instructors given notice of nonrenewal well before the 
84. /d. at 980. But see Nelson v. County of los Angeles, 362 U.S. I (1960) (opinion by Mr. 
Justice Brennan): "Doubtless a probationary employee can constitutionally be discharged 
without specification of reasons at all; and this Court has not held that it would offend the Due 
Process Clause, without more, for a State to put its entire civil service on such a basis, if as a 
matter of internal policy it could stand to do so." /d. at 16. It is clear, moreover, that the courts 
will continue to allow the utmost latitude with respect to what constitutes a "not inappropriate" 
basis for failure to renew a probationary teacher. For instance, a reasonable desire to upgrade 
the quality of a given department by bringing in new faculty members with greater experience or 
credentials may be sufficient reason to terminate a probationary instructor upon fair notice of 
nonrenewal; it is not at all necessary that the decision of nonrenewal reflect a judgment that the 
instructor's performance of his teaching duties was inadequate in any respect. See Fluker v. 
Alabama State Bd. of Educ., __ F. Supp. __ (M.D. Ala. 1970). The tentative advances in 
the enlargement of pretermination procedural due process ought not be seen as a threat to 
institutional autonomy in the formulation of substantive standards. 
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end of the expiration of their second one-year contracts had "not been 
accorded procedural due process" and were entitled to "formal notice 
and specification of the charges and a hearing" before termination by 
nonrenewal could become effective.85 
Almost simultaneously, the same Wisconsin federal district court 
that decided the Roth case also reinstated several tenured and non-
tenured state university professors who were merely suspended with 
full pay, but excluded from the campus, because the institution 
regarded the teachers' continuing presence during highly disruptive 
campus events as an immediate danger. No notice was furnished to 
explain the way in which their presence allegedly contributed to the 
danger, however. Neither was any preliminary hearing provided prior 
to the suspension nor assured at the earliest practical time following 
such interim suspension, assuming that emergency circumstances 
made even a preliminary prior hearing impractical.81 
More instructive than the fact that the courts in these cases 
specifically based the result on the teachers' constitutional right to 
procedur~l due process, or the fact that each represents an extension 
of the form of that due process beyond anything hitherto recognized 
in comparable circumstances in any other court, is the particular 
weighing process which was employed. In Roth, by far the most 
elaborate of the several cases, the court noted the following items 
which weighed in favor of the claim for notice, statement of reasons 
on request, and an opportunity for hearing: 
l. Of 442 non-tenured teachers at the university, only four were 
given notice that contracts would not be offered them for 1969-70. 
Thus, the technical consideration that the employee was merely on a 
one-year contract and altogether lacked tenure simply was not 
conclusive of the real situation. Where customary practice indicates, 
as it did in Roth, that continued employment is ordinarily to be 
expected and nonrenewal is extraordinary (less than one percent of 
probationary employees did not receive contracts for the following 
year), the alleged need of the university employer for complete 
freedom of summary termination will be tested according to the 
reality of the situation rather than the legal form. The point for public 
school teachers on annual contract where, however, nonrenewal is 
equally exceptional is a valuable one. Indeed, where nonrenewal is 
85. Fluker v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., _F. Supp. _(M.D. Ala. 1970}. 
86. Lafertyv.Carter,310 ~.Supp.465 (W.D. Wis.l970). 
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otherwise a relatively rare event, the administrative burden of 
furnishing a written statement of reasons and an opportunity to be 
heard on request cannot be onerous. Similarly, the very fact that 
nonrenewal may be known to be a rare event in the practices of the 
particular institution makes the act of nonrenewal in a given case a 
much more severe judgment than otherwise and one which is 
correspondingly more likely to affect a teacher's opportunities 
elsewhere as well. As a consequence one is entitled to a fuller measure 
ofpretermination procedural due process. 
2. The nonrenewal arose during political controversy on 
campus; inde6d, the terminated teacher separately alleged that the 
decision not to renew was in retaliation for expressions he claimed 
were protected by the first amendment. The court was quick to discern 
that the theoretical constitutional protection of such a substantive 
right could readily be subverted in the absence of some minimal 
pretermination procedure: "Substantive constitutional protection for 
a university professor against non-retention is useless without 
procedural safeguards." 87 Thus, the prophylactic value of 
pretermination procedures under the circumstances was reasonably 
essential not merely to protect the teacher's economic and 
reputational interests but his substantive constitutional interests as 
well. 
3. The job impact on the teacher in his prospects for relocating 
elsewhere was more substantial than in the Cafeteria Workers case, 
involving potential exclusion from many, not just one, places of 
employment; the pub lie interest in his protection was greater, given 
the public benefits flowing from the protection of academic freedom; 
the custom of authoritarian operation of universities is nowhere near 
as firm or habitual as that of military installations; and the 
governmental reason for acting and withholding the basis so to 
act-national security-is without qualitative counterpart on behalf 
of the university.88 
87. 310 F.Supp.at979-80. 
88. The reasoning and basic pretermination procedural guarantees developed in Roth were 
applied four days later by the same court in behalf of two public school teachers whose annual 
contracts had not been renewed: 
[A] teacher in a public elementary or secondary school is entitled to a statement of the 
reasons for considering nonrenewal, a notice of a hearing at which the teacher can 
respond to the stated reasons, and the actual holding of such a hearing if the teacher 
appears at the specified time and place. A necessary corollary to this proposition-not 
stated in the opinion in Roth-is that the Board's ultimate decision may not rest on a 
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Moreover, substantial educational support is accruing for the 
emerging judicial view that the reasonable protection of institutional 
discretion to evaluate its probationary academic staff does not require 
the perpetuation of wholly summary and unreviewable powers of 
nonrenewal or termination. In the majority of colleges and 
universities, the authority to make these decisions is delegated in the 
first instance to the senior faculty of each' department. Even so, the 
American Association of University Professors, which tends to draw 
a high proportion of its members from the senior faculty ranks and is 
very much influenced by considerations of quality control, has 
recently proposed procedural standards virtually equivalent to those 
set down in Roth.89 As courts may appropriately defer in otherwise 
doubtful cases to the judgment of those closest to the firipg line of 
education, professional recommendations such as these may 
themselves contribute to the formation of the constitutional norm. 
EPILOGUE: Is IT A Constitution WHICH THE COURTS HAVE BEEN 
EXPOUNDING? 
The formulation of degrees of pretermination procedural due 
process immediately· responsive to the very particular facts of each 
case does, as previously suggested, accurately reflect the Supreme 
Court's method of constitutional analysis of such matters. Initially, 
moreover, it seems entirely proper that constitutional courts should 
lay heavy emphasis upon the special facts actually present in each case 
in determining what due process may require under the particular 
circumstances. The duty of the court is, after all, only to answer on 
the case that grants it the authority to speak at all. It is rather for 
legislatures or rule-making administrative agencies to provide justice 
by larger categories-justice wholesale-through the enactment of 
broad rules more or less inclusive of only roughly similar activity. 
basis of which the teacher was never notified, nor may it rest on a basis to which the 
teacher had no fair opportunity to respond. 
Gouge v. Joint School Dist. 310 F. Supp. 984 (W.D. Wis. 1970). See also Orr v. Trinter, Civ. 
Act. No. 70-163 (S.D. Ohio 1970); Domenicone v. School Comm., R.I. Comm'r of Educ. No. 
_ (May 20, 1970). Compare Thaw v. Board of Pub. Instru~tion, No. 29488 (5th Cir. 
Sept. 22, 1970) (public school teacher on probation without expectancy of renewal and not 
alleging interference with a substantive constitutional right is not entitled to a pretermination 
hearing); Shirck v. Thomas, 315 F. Supp. 1124 (S.D. Ill. 1970); Drown v. Portsmouth School 
Dist., No. _(D.N.H. June I) (unreported), appeal pending, No. 7667 (1st Cir. 1970). 
89. See Report of Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure, Procedural Standards in 
the Renewal or Nonrenewal of Faculty Appointments, 56 A.A.U.P. BULL. 21 (1970). 
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Article 111 courts have a different and more limited function: to decide 
particular cases, avoiding broad and premature pronouncements 
beyond the exigencies of the case, and to secure constitutional justice 
at retail in response more exactly to each individual situation. 
It is difficult to complain, therefore, that the very close contextual 
application of varying degrees of procedural due process illustrated by 
the Supreme Court's decisions in Greene and in Cafeteria Workers 
may in fact be a little too precious, that the technique tends to make 
intellectual sport of differences bordering on picayune detail, or that 
something about its basic style does not fit the construction of a 
constitution. Certainly the decisions do not represent an unprincipled 
brand of ad hoc constitutionalism. They are not at all ad hoc in the 
pejorative sense of representing whimsical changes of constitutional 
values, for there was in fact commendable continuity in the selection 
of values to be considered and in the relative weight assigned to each 
value. Rather, the decisions are ad hoc only in the desirable sense that 
particular differences of fact quite properly affected the merit of the 
petitioners' claims that each had been denied due process. The 
relevance and weight of the effect of termination upon the career of 
the employee, for instance, remained the same in measuring the 
requisite degree of pretermination procedural due process in the two 
cases; it was simply the lesser degree of hardship in fact which may 
have spelled the difference in the particular outcome of each case. 
To suggest alternatively that it is unseemly for the Supreme Court 
serially to review a careful, albeit lengthy, list of cost-benefit due 
process considerations against the facts of each particular case, 
moreover, creates the risk of being identified as a critic who would 
favor a more wooden, careless, and anti-intellectual standard of 
constitutional review-a standard which ignores close factual 
distinctions of obvious importance to the more thoughtful mind, 
squeezing actually dissimilar situations into the pretense of sameness 
and summarily dispensing justice in a grand manner but with very 
little heed for the particular consequenees. Something more than an 
appreciation for the easier aesthetics of categorical constitutionalism 
is surely required to make the case that the Court's current technique 
suffers some inadequacy. 
Nevertheless, something is disturbing about the current mode of 
procedural due process analysis which operates with such everlasting 
Frankfurterian fine-grained finesse that one wonders whether it is, in 
fact, a constitution which is being expounded. That the judge-made 
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common law of torts should yield different results on the basis of 
slight factual nuances, perceptively seen and wisely distinguished by a 
common law court, is probably not distressing to other judges, to 
lawyers, or to clients and laymen with the patience to understand. It is 
simply less believable, however, that even the vague and general 
written standards fixed in the Constitution either contemplate or 
require a technique of judicial needlepoint that turns the applied 
definition of "due process" upon the problematical ramifications of 
each discrete factual complex in which the claim is raised. While we 
do not blanch at the thought that a common law court may resolve an 
issue of proximate cause differently in two cases upon a close 
examination of the manner in which seven, eight, or nine elements 
were exactly involved in the particular accident, the assumption that 
the Constitution contemplates similarly molecular judicial activity in 
the administration of any of its provisions is more nearly incredible. 
If in Cafeteria Workers, for instance, Rachael Brawner had not 
· been swiftly placed in a nearly identical job through ihe effort of her 
union, should the Court have concluded that her summary discharge 
was lacking in procedural due process, requiring her reinstatement 
pending some fuller procedure? If in Roth, on the other hand, the 
university had been able to show that Roth had secured an equivalent 
position elsewhere by the time the case came on for argument, would 
it then be clear in retrospect that procedural due process had not been 
disregarded in the peremptory manner of his termination by the 
university? Or if the percentage of those nontenured faculty members 
routinely not renewed at the Oshkosh branch of the University of 
Wisconsin had been 20 percent, rather than 1 percent or 5, 12, or 18 
percent, would the practice of summary nonrenewal be unoffensive to 
the fourteenth amendment? To raise these annoying possibilities is not 
merely to ply a bothersome style of pedagogy which shows an overly 
sensitive appreciation for the possible limitations of a given case; it is, 
rather, to suggest the ground for acute discomfort that fundamental 
law, constitutional law, can credibly permit such nuances of slight 
distinction to affect the outcome of particular cases. 
Several very high and eminently practical costs are connected, 
moreover, with a technique of constitutional interpretation which 
measures the application of a given clause according to the exquisite 
particularity of a large assortment of factual variables in each discrete 
case. Some of these are well illustrated by the difficulties which the 
Supreme Court encountered in employing this same style of 
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constitutional analysis to the constitutional right to counsel at the 
trial stage of a felony prosecution. In Betts v. Brady,90 the Court did 
not hold that appointment of counsel was never required as a matter 
of due process but merely that the risks of error and prejudice were 
not sufficient on the facts of the particular case to make failure to 
appoint counsel fatal to the constitutionality of the trial. The outcome 
of other cases, the Court implied, could depend upon the specific 
involvement of many facts-the age of the accused, his experience 
with the criminal process, his degree of formal education, the 
complexity of the charge, the character of the legal issues, the gravity 
of the offense, and so forth. 91 The rigor of the analysis assumed an 
unrealistic degree of specialized learning in the nuances of due process 
on the part of state trial judges, however, and the same assumption 
was made concerning counsel responsible to insure the preparation of 
a record adequate for review by appellate courts. The Supreme Court 
itself was repeatedly petitioned to review a swelling number of cases, 
more-or-less alike, with each decision expending the scarce resources 
of the Court but yielding a result of extremely limited value beyond 
the resolution of the immediate case. A number of probably erroneous 
convictions remained untouched, moreover, due to the sheer 
incapacity of the system to examine them with the required degree of 
exacting scrutiny. The factorial complexity of the "proper" due 
process test may well have produced substantial instances of 
individual injustice. 
To be sure, this byproduct of closely-reasoned, closely-limited due 
process decisions would be largely avoided were public bodies to 
shape their rules to be categorically overinclusive of the exact 
constitutional requirements declared by the Court. For instance, had 
each state responded to Betts v. Brady by providing that counsel 
would automatically be appointed upon request of an indigent 
involving criminal proceedings above the grade of petty offense, the 
generosity of the legislative response would have eased the problems 
of clients, lawyers, trial courts, appellate courts, and the Supreme 
Court. Thus it may be fair to suggest that the fault was not necessarily 
with the Court's style of particularity of constitutional analysis, but 
with the grudging character oflegislative and administrative response. 
In similar fashion, congestion, confusion, and endless post-Roth 
90. 316 U.S.455 (1942). 
91. See id. at462,472. 
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litigation may readily be avoided if universities would now move to 
provide a general rule that anyone whose contract is not renewed shall 
receive several months advance notice, a written statement in 
explanation upon request, and an adequate opportunity for informal 
review upon request prior to the effective date of the notice. The 
constitutionally overinclusive generosity of these new rules might 
provide a practical and desirable response to the problem. 
However, recent history itself indicates that public bodies seldom 
respond in this fashion, least of all when they are hostile to the 
substance even of the courts' closely limited decisions. Disagreeing 
with the judicial decision and believing that it works an unrealistic 
hardship upon themselves and upon their view of the public interest, 
legislative and administrative agencies may predictably resist its 
gratuitous extension by any action of their own. Indeed, the technique 
of constitutional interpretation employed by the courts may itself 
contribute to this phenomenon; after all, didn't the Court itself 
say-or at least imply-that a slight difference in the facts would have 
made it plain that due process does not require, and that preponderant 
public interests might be disserved by, overly protective procedural 
standards that are expensive to society and inessential to fundamental 
fairness? If slight changes of factual circumstances are sufficient to 
make a constitutional difference, ought they not be equally important 
as a matter of sound administrative policy as well? In short, may it 
not be true that the technique of closely fact-limited constitutional 
analysis as distinct from a somewhat more categorical assessment 
itself invites the problems of closely-limited legislative and 
administrative response? 
These conjectures aside, the original point remains: a 
constitutional description of procedural due process in which the 
requirement for each item of procedural regularity critically depends 
upon a piecemeal review of a vast assortment of adjudicative facts 
actually established in each individual case fundamentally detracts 
from the common need to know what the Constitution requires and 
from the common desire that the Constitution speak with greater 
majesty. 
It is clear, moreover, that needlepoint analyses are not inherent in 
constitutional review. In Gideon v. Wainwright,'2 the Supreme Court 
abandoned the ••truer" -more elaborate and specifically fact-
92. 372 u.s. 335 (1963}. . 
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oriented-approach it had attempted to pursue after Betts v. Brady, 
signalling that it would no longer presume to know what differences in 
age, education, and simplicity of issues might theoretically contribute 
to the constitutional requirement of appointed counsel. Rather, it 
weighed the issues on broader facts, categorically concluding with the 
blunter proposition that due process requires appointment of counsel 
as an indispensable step to the integrity of the proceedings. The 
decision in one sense, to be sure, rested on a less intellectual approach 
than that used in Betts v. Brady. Applied retrospectively, it may even 
have resulted in the reversal of some convictions where the absence of 
counsel was not in fact prejudicial. It may also have operated further 
to increase the cost of administering criminal justice, even as it left 
other issues still unclear93 and failed by any means to insure fairness to 
the accused.9' But it would be utterly unreasonable to insist that 
Gideon would constitute an end of the general matter; it was merely a 
new beginning. 
The departure taken in Gideon does, moreover, warrant specific 
comment if only to note hs essential divergence in judicial technique 
from the still continuing, multiple fact emphasis in due process cases 
including the administrative termination of public employees. The 
two lines of approach have gone along, side by side, with little notice 
taken of the gradual divergence in basic technique. As the federal 
courts gradually gain a greater fund of experience and confidence in 
the constitutional review of public employment cases,· however, it is 
entirely possible that the need will be seen to resolve these cases too in 
broader terms and larger categories of similarity. On balance, it is a 
prospect that deserves en.couragement. 
93. For example, at what point in the process must counsel be offered? With what grade o 
offense'? 
94. Indifferent lawyers, attracted only by the small public fee in the case, would come 
forn ard to go through the motions of representation as required by Gideon. 
